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RESPONDENT’S BRIEF

Issue
Has Sorenson failed to establish that the district court abused its discretion, either by
imposing a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed, upon the jury’s verdict finding
him guilty of attempted strangulation, or by denying his Rule 35 motion for a reduction of
sentence?

Sorenson Has Failed To Establish That The District Court Abused Its Sentencing Discretion
In October 2016, Sorenson went to his estranged wife’s house after midnight and “began
pounding on the doors and windows of her home and yelling” her name (“Andi”). (R., p.18.)
Andi “did not want [Sorenson] to wake up [their 20-month-old daughter], so she stepped out
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onto the front porch to speak with him.” (R., pp.18-19.) When she asked Sorenson to leave, he
refused, “told her to stop acting like a ‘bitch,’” grabbed her wrists, and “tried to kiss her.” (R.,
p.19.) Andi pushed him away, and he “responded by yelling at her, calling her names, and
rushing towards her, grabbing her by the neck and pushing her backwards against the metal hand
rail on the front porch”; he then “pushed her over backwards into a tree in the flower bed.” (R.,
p.19.)

Andi “fought back and stood up, but he pushed her over again … this happened

approximately four times” before Sorenson “grabbed the hood on her sweatshirt and her hair”
and “pulled her by the hair and hood” into the residence, “through the living room[,] and into the
kitchen,” where he “‘slammed’ her into the stove and grabbed her by the throat again.” (R.,
p.19.)
Andi “had been screaming for help, but the louder she screamed, the harder he would
squeeze on her neck,” so she “tried to calm down to prevent him from squeezing harder on her
neck,” while he “continued to scream profanities at her.” (R., p.19.) Sorenson subsequently
“dragged her into the living room, holding onto her throat and one of her arms, pushed her down
onto the couch,” sat “on top of her chest,” and refused to “get off of her.” (R., p.19.) At one
point, Andi was able to retrieve her phone and attempted to call for help; however, Sorenson
“grabbed her wrist that she was holding the phone in and began squeezing and shaking her hand
until he made her ‘throw it backwards.’” (R., p.19.) He then began “twisting her hoodie around
her throat, causing it to constrict her airway.” (R., p.19.) Andi “thought she was going to ‘die,’”
so she “began telling him what he wanted to hear”; they subsequently “talked for approximately
45 minutes about their relationship and reconciling.” (R., p.19.)
Andi was finally able to escape when Sorenson “went outside to smoke” – while he was
in the backyard, she grabbed their infant daughter, “ran out the front door,” and kept running
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until she was “exhausted.” (R., p.20.) An officer who was on patrol in the area drove past Andi,
but “made a U-turn … to perform a welfare check” upon noticing that she and her daughter were
underdressed for the cold weather. (R., p.18.) Andi saw the patrol vehicle and “began waving
[the officer] down.” (R., pp.18, 20.) When Andi approached the patrol vehicle, the officer
immediately noted that “[she] and the toddler both had blue colored skin and appeared to be
shivering.” (R., p.18.) Andi told the officer that “her ex-husband had attempted to kill her” and
that she “was repeatedly pushed over the top of a metal hand rail on her front porch. She said
her ribs on the right side of her body were extremely sore and she thought they may be broken.”
(R., p.18.) The officer transported Andi and her daughter to the hospital, where Andi described
the incident in further detail, reporting that Sorenson “had tried to strangle her four to five times”
and she was “having difficulty breathing, change in voice, and difficulty swallowing.” (R.,
pp.18, 20.) The officer documented Andi’s visible injuries, which included “bruising on her
upper arms,” “a purple-red mark on the left side of her neck,” “scrapes, scratches, and bruising
behind both of her ears,” “broken blood vessels under the skin just above her right clavicle,”
“liner [sic] bruises and abrasions on her back and ribcage consistent with her report of being held
over the metal hand rail on her porch,” “scrapes to her knee and pinky toe, and a chipped toenail
on her big toe.” (R., p.20.)
Upon leaving the hospital, Andi requested “a civil stand-by while she returned to [her
residence]” and “gave [officers] a key to the house so that [they] could clear the residence to
make sure that [Sorenson] was not still in the house, lying in wait.” (R., p.21.) Sorenson had
locked all of the doors and turned off all of the lights in Andi’s home, and he did not respond to
officers’ instructions “that anyone inside verbally identify themselves.” (R., p.21.) While
conducting the “security sweep,” officers found Sorenson “in the bathroom with the lights off,”
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“with Andi’s journal.” (R., p.21.) Sorenson initially refused to obey the officers’ directions that
he exit the bathroom and “get down on his knees” – he did not comply until officers had drawn
their “Taser[s]” and “told him to get down onto the ground or he would be tased.” (R., p.21.)
The state charged Sorenson with attempted strangulation. (R., pp.65-66.) The case
proceeded to trial and a jury found Sorenson guilty. (R., p.440.) The district court imposed a
unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed. (R., pp.468-71.) Sorenson filed a notice of
appeal timely from the judgment of conviction. (R., pp.479-83.) He also filed a timely Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence, which the district court denied. (R., pp.491-93, 496-97.)
Sorenson asserts his sentence is excessive in light of his purported acceptance of
responsibility and remorse, acknowledgement that he has self-esteem issues, and because he
“had been practicing cycle abuse ending over the course of the past year.” (Appellant’s brief,
pp.3-5.) The record supports the sentence imposed.
When evaluating whether a sentence is excessive, the court considers the entire length of
the sentence under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 8, 368 P.3d
621, 628 (2016); State v. Stevens, 146 Idaho 139, 148, 191 P.3d 217, 226 (2008). It is presumed
that the fixed portion of the sentence will be the defendant’s probable term of confinement. State
v. Oliver, 144 Idaho 722, 726, 170 P.3d 687, 391 (2007). Where a sentence is within statutory
limits, the appellant bears the burden of demonstrating that it is a clear abuse of discretion.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (citations omitted). To carry this burden the appellant
must show the sentence is excessive under any reasonable view of the facts. Id. A sentence is
reasonable if it appears necessary to accomplish the primary objective of protecting society and
to achieve any or all of the related goals of deterrence, rehabilitation, or retribution. Id. The
district court has the discretion to weigh those objectives and give them differing weights when
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deciding upon the sentence. Id. at 9, 368 P.3d at 629; State v. Moore, 131 Idaho 814, 825, 965
P.2d 174, 185 (1998) (court did not abuse its discretion in concluding that the objectives of
punishment, deterrence and protection of society outweighed the need for rehabilitation). “In
deference to the trial judge, this Court will not substitute its view of a reasonable sentence where
reasonable minds might differ.” McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 8, 368 P.3d at 628 (quoting Stevens,
146 Idaho at 148-49, 191 P.3d at 226-27). Furthermore, “[a] sentence fixed within the limits
prescribed by the statute will ordinarily not be considered an abuse of discretion by the trial
court.” Id. (quoting State v. Nice, 103 Idaho 89, 90, 645 P.2d 323, 324 (1982)).
The maximum prison sentence for attempted strangulation is 15 years. I.C. § 18-923.
The district court imposed a unified sentence of 15 years, with five years fixed, which falls well
within the statutory guidelines.

(R., pp.468-71.)

Furthermore, Sorenson’s sentence is

appropriate in light of the serious nature of the offense, the harm done to the victim, and
Sorenson’s history of violent behavior, refusal to accept full responsibility, lack of sincere
remorse, and high risk to reoffend.
Sorenson’s criminal history consists solely of crimes in which he victimized and/or
endangered others. (PSI, pp.20-22. 1) In September 2013, he was charged with domestic battery
in the presence of a child after he battered his then-wife, Amy, while their son was present. (PSI,
pp.8, 20.) Amy reported that, during her marriage to Sorenson, “she went through similar (to the
instant offense) instances of domestic battery and attempted strangulation.” (PSI, pp.8, 19
(parenthetical notation added).) Amy stated that, in one incident, Sorenson “pinned [her] to the
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PSI page numbers correspond with the page numbers of the electronic file “CONFIDENTIAL
CERTIFICATE OF EXHIBITS SORENSON 45793.pdf.”
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sofa and spat on her”; in a separate incident, he “backed [her] against the patio wall and he was
close enough that she was unable to move to either side,” “screamed at [her] and called her
numerous different names including ‘slut,’” “slapped [her] two times across the face,” and – after
she went inside and locked the doors – he “kicked the door while he was still yelling and
screaming,” damaging the door frame. (PSI, p.8.)
In November 2013, Sorenson was granted a withheld judgment for a DUI and was placed
on probation, from which he was “discharged unsatisfied” approximately one year later. (PSI,
p.21.) He was charged with injury to a child in July 2014, disturbing the peace in March 2015,
and battery and disturbing the peace in August 2015; however, these charges were later
dismissed. (PSI, pp.21-22.) Sorenson was convicted of animal abuse and mistreatment in April
2016, and was on probation for that offense when he committed the instant offense
approximately six months later. (PSI, p.22.) The victim of the instant offense, Andi, reported
that she “was married to Craig Sorenson for two years” and “suffered physical abuse at the hands
of Craig Sorenson for the majority of their time together (every other day), which is why they
separated.” (PSI, p.20 (parenthetical notation original).) She advised that she and Sorenson had
been separated for approximately nine months when he showed up at her house and attempted to
strangle her in the instant offense. (R., p.18.)
Despite his criminal history, Sorenson reported that he does not believe he has problems
with – or needs any treatment for – anger, domestic violence, mental health, or substance abuse
issues. (PSI, p.5.) With respect to his ex-wife, Amy, he stated that “‘she isn’t a victim,’” despite
the fact that he was convicted for the incident in which he hit Amy several times in the face,
leaving “a pronounced red mark on her right cheek” that was apparent to the responding officers.
(PSI, pp.8, 20-21.) When asked about the instant offense against his estranged wife, Andi,
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Sorenson stated that he “did not commit a crime” and admitted only that he sent her “‘some
nasty text messages.’” (PSI, pp.5, 20.) He later acknowledged that he had been involved in “a
scuffle” with Andi, but blamed her for the incident entirely, claiming that she “threatened” him
with a knife and then “turned it to herself,” and that the “bruising” and “ligature marks” she
sustained were merely the result of his attempts to disarm her. (Tr., p.372, L.5 – p.374, L.4.)
The domestic violence evaluator reported that Sorenson “showed no obvious remorse for
his behavior” and that he “does not see himself as needing any kind of treatment.” (PSI, p.5.)
The evaluator advised that Sorenson “show[ed] enough Psychopathic traits to warrant concern,”
and concluded that “Sorenson appears to present a very high risk of reoffending, and a similarly
high risk for child abuse, as compared with other individuals who have been arrested for
domestic violence (i.e., anyone with one such arrest is at significantly higher risk of offending
than others with no prior DV arrest).”

(PSI, p.12 (parenthetical notation original).)

The

presentence investigator likewise determined that Sorenson “is a HIGH risk offender,” “[d]ue to
his past violence, current violent crime, and attitude.” (PSI, p.25 (capitalization original).) The
presentence investigator recommended imprisonment, stating, “Given Mr. Sorenson’s
uncooperative attitude, and the serious nature of this crime, I do not feel he is a viable candidate
for probation at this time. He takes no responsibility for his behavior, and is considered a very
high risk if left in the community.” (PSI, p.27.)
At sentencing, the district court articulated the correct legal standards applicable to its
decision and also set forth its reasons for imposing Sorenson’s sentence. (Tr., p.375, L.25 –
p.379, L.5.) The state submits that Sorenson has failed to establish an abuse of discretion, for
reasons more fully set forth in the attached excerpt of the sentencing hearing transcript, which
the state adopts as its argument on appeal. (Appendix A.)
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Sorenson next asserts that the district court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35
motion for a reduction of sentence. (Appellant’s brief, p.5.) If a sentence is within applicable
statutory limits, a motion for reduction of sentence under Rule 35 is a plea for leniency, and this
court reviews the denial of the motion for an abuse of discretion. State v. Huffman, 144 Idaho,
201, 203, 159 P.3d 838, 840 (2007). To prevail on appeal, Sorenson must “show that the
sentence is excessive in light of new or additional information subsequently provided to the
district court in support of the Rule 35 motion.” Id. Sorenson has failed to satisfy his burden.
In support of his Rule 35 motion, Sorenson provided a letter in which he stated that he
had been participating in programs while in the jail, and a second letter from “Katherine Jones,”
his “former landlord,” in which she reiterated her observation of Sorenson’s “progress.”
(Appellant’s brief, p.5; PSI, pp.57, 64-65.) This was not “new” information, as Sorenson
reported that he was participating in programs, including “Christian Recovery,” and that he
believed he was making progress, before he was sentenced in this case. (PSI, p.57; Tr., p.371,
Ls.18-22.) Furthermore, at the time of sentencing, the district court had a letter from “Martha K.
Jones” (who appears to be the same former landlord, as she has the same address and phone
number as “Katherine Jones”), in which she wrote about Sorenson’s activities and progress.
(PSI, pp.56, 64; Tr., p.369, Ls.14-22.) Sorenson’s participation in programs while incarcerated is
– as the district court noted – what is “expected. This is what he needs to do. This is the time
that he needs to be away in order to reflect and make some changes in his life, and that was the
whole purpose of the imposition of the sentence that [the court] imposed ….” (Tr., p.385, Ls.38.) Because Sorenson presented no new evidence in support of his Rule 35 motion, xx failed to
demonstrate in the motion that his sentence was excessive. The state submits that by failing to
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establish his sentence was excessive as imposed, Sorenson has also failed to establish the district
court abused its discretion by denying his Rule 35 motion.

Conclusion
The state respectfully requests this Court to affirm Sorenson’s conviction and sentence
and the district court’s order denying Sorenson’s Rule 35 motion for a reduction of sentence.

DATED this 26th day of October, 2018.

__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General

VICTORIA RUTLEDGE
Paralegal

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I HEREBY CERTIFY that I have this 26th day of October, 2018, served a true and
correct copy of the attached RESPONDENT’S BRIEF to the attorney listed below by means of
iCourt File and Serve:
JUSTIN M. CURTIS
DEPUTY STATE APPELLATE PUBLIC DEFENDER
documents@sapd.state.id.us.
__/s/_Lori A. Fleming____________
LORI A. FLEMING
Deputy Attorney General
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